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David Bishai1,3*, Ligia Paina2, Qingfeng Li1,3, David H Peters2 and Adnan A Hyder2,3Abstract
Introduction: This paper presents a system dynamics computer simulation model to illustrate unintended
consequences of apparently rational allocations to curative and preventive services.
Methods: A modeled population is subject to only two diseases. Disease A is a curable disease that can be
shortened by curative care. Disease B is an instantly fatal but preventable disease. Curative care workers are
financed by public spending and private fees to cure disease A. Non-personal, preventive services are delivered
by public health workers supported solely by public spending to prevent disease B. Each type of worker tries to tilt the
balance of government spending towards their interests. Their influence on the government is proportional to their
accumulated revenue.
Results: The model demonstrates effects on lost disability-adjusted life years and costs over the course of several
epidemics of each disease. Policy interventions are tested including: i) an outside donor rationally donates extra
money to each type of disease precisely in proportion to the size of epidemics of each disease; ii) lobbying is eliminated;
iii) fees for personal health services are eliminated; iv) the government continually rebalances the funding for prevention
by ring-fencing it to protect it from lobbying.
The model exhibits a “spend more get less” equilibrium in which higher revenue by the curative sector is used to
influence government allocations away from prevention towards cure. Spending more on curing disease A leads
paradoxically to a higher overall disease burden of unprevented cases of disease B. This paradoxical behavior of the
model can be stopped by eliminating lobbying, eliminating fees for curative services, and ring-fencing public health
funding.
Conclusions: We have created an artificial system as a laboratory to gain insights about the trade-offs between curative
and preventive health allocations, and the effect of indicative policy interventions. The underlying dynamics of this
artificial system resemble features of modern health systems where a self-perpetuating industry has grown up around
disease-specific curative programs like HIV/AIDS or malaria. The model shows how the growth of curative care services
can crowd both fiscal and policy space for the practice of population level prevention work, requiring dramatic
interventions to overcome these trends.Introduction
Achieving optimum health of a population requires an art-
ful combination of preventing ill health and responding to
disease cases with curative services. Both are important,
but there are predictable obstacles to achieving balance.
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unless otherwise stated.budget is available for investments in both non-personal
preventive and curative personal health services. A variety
of influences affect the allocation of this common health
budget [1]. Ideally, these factors include efficiency and
equity. In reality, concerns also include policy and political
priorities, which often take precedence over efficiency and
equity criteria [2]. This struggle between evidence-based
decision-making to achieve health system goals and the
reality of policy and financing constraints occurs in a
variety of contexts besides government health ministries.
Fixed government health budgets lend themselves to a
zero-sum game in resource allocation between cure andtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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less for prevention and vice versa. It is observed with re-
gularity, in both high-income and low- and middle-
income settings, that whenever there is a fixed sum to
be allocated between curing and preventing diseases, a
higher total will be spent on curing than preventing, and
more will be spent per disability-adjusted life year
(DALY) averted by curing than preventing [3-6]. For
example, although the burden of disease associated
with chronic, non-communicable diseases is significant, in
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment countries average expenditure on public health
and prevention for non-communicable diseases was only
3% of the total health expenditure in 2005, while average
expenditure on curative care was 57% [7]. The situation
can be even direr in developing countries, particularly in
sub-Saharan Africa, where the large urban hospitals often
receive at least half of the public funds spent on health [8].
Spending more money per DALY averted on curing
than preventing violates both efficiency and equity goals. It
violates efficiency standards by definition. If intervention P
saves more lives per incremental dollar than intervention
C then a shift of spending from C to P will save more lives
but it will not cost more. It also violates equity standards
because access to curative services is often achieved pref-
erentially by those with greater social privilege [9]. The
preventive interventions we consider here are delivered to
a population en masse rather than in individual clinical
encounters and they have been shown to decrease popula-
tion health disparities and increase health equity [10,11].
Preventing is not always more efficient than curing.
Many preventive health care procedures delivered to in-
dividuals in clinics are not uniformly more cost-effective
than curative clinical services [12]. However, most pre-
ventive interventions are not clinical procedures, they are
community and environmental interventions mounted by
public health entities. By shifting the environmental and
social determinants of health for populations millions at a
time, public health expenditures are typically best buys in
health [13].
This paper analyzes a process whereby a neutral policy
change undertaken in the name of efficiency can lead
to a spiraling increase in the power of groups whose
self-interest will block rational and efficient allocation
of public resources in the future. A standard decision
analysis of option A vs. option B will be inadequate if
option A commits future generations to depart from
rational policy making because of the power of interest
groups created by option A. To be specific, the model de-
veloped here examines how health policies may enhance
the class power of curative care interests (e.g., clinicians,
hospitals, medicine manufacturers) and lead to a snowball
effect that exaggerates a bias to spend more towards
clinically-oriented health spending in the future.Power politics are unavoidable in health policy [14].
Examples of policy makers successfully appealing to
cost-effectiveness data and not politics to rationalize
their health spending portfolio are few [15]. In fact,
many examples show that policy-makers do not use
cost-effectiveness data to decide on budget allocation
[16,17]. There are simple explanations for why decision-
makers whose stated objective in budgetary allocation is
to avert DALYs at lowest cost fail to actually allocate
spending accordingly. Most explanations focus on the
decision-makers lack of cost-effectiveness data or un-
familiarity with the paradigm [2,12]. However, the regu-
larity of the bias towards cure and away from prevention
suggests that something more structural and systematic
must be at work.
The models that will yield understanding will need to
encompass unintended consequences of complex adap-
tive systems. A growing body of literature explores the
role of complexity in health systems [18-21]. For this
paper, we use the principles of system dynamics modeling
to develop understanding of non-linear interactions in de-
fined systems [22]. Using system dynamics, researchers
can simulate policy scenarios which cannot be carried out
in real populations or for which adequate historical data
on natural experiments is not available. We offer a simple
model of political lobbying between the curative health
care sector and public health proponents situated in a
hypothetical population with a very simple epidemio-
logical problem.
We are pursuing a form of “generative” social science—
applying the adage “if you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain
it” [23]; being able to generate a phenomenon without
pre-supposing it is the best way to understand it, and this
is best done in a simulation. The model is simple enough
so that we can turn parts on and off allowing readers to
understand which of the dynamics emerge from the
simplistic assumptions and which result from the policy
experiments. The omitted complexities of real world spend-
ing and lobbying would certainly mitigate the dire con-
sequences that befall the population in our simplified
model. That underscores the advantage of the model in
offering insight into processes that are harder to measure
in the thicket of real world observations. The model
intentionally exaggerates important aspects of the real
system – the exaggeration is a feature, not a flaw.
This artificial model is not trying to fit any real-world
epidemiological data. The purpose of the model is to
gain understanding of elementary political forces that
can be turned on and off in the model. Specifically, one
can test the effect on population health of government
policies that:
i) Rationally allocate spending according to neutral
cost-effectiveness criteria.
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group lobbying or not.
iii)Accept or refuse spending by non-governmental
organization (NGO) external donors that target
either disease A or B.
iv)Allow fee-for-service revenue for curative care
workers.
Methods
We model a finite population that is susceptible to only
two possible unwanted health conditions. Individuals can
suffer from an acute disease, called disease A, that is disab-
ling, never lethal, and whose duration can be shortened by
a visit to a doctor. They can also suffer from a sudden, in-
stantaneously lethal condition, disease B, that can never be
cured, but which can be prevented through environmental
engineering by preventive care workers (PCWs) (if it helps,
one can think of disease A as something like an intestinal
parasite, e.g., ascariasis, and disease B as something like
a bicycle crash). Disease A, if untreated, causes 100%
disability for 0.5 years before recovery. Each untreated
case of disease A imposes 0.5 DALYs on the population.
Disease B kills each victim instantly and deprives them
of 25 additional years of survival; each case of disease B
imposes 25 DALYS. Both the doctors and the PCWs are
supported by a fixed-sum budget allocated by the gov-
ernment. In contrast to the PCWs, the doctors can
also collect fees from each patient who sees them after
contracting disease A. Both PCWs and doctors invest
a similar portion of their earnings on lobbying the
government for a larger share of the fixed-sum budget.
The government can be swayed by the lobbying, in
which case it allocates the budget proportionally to the
size of the lobbying funds of the respective two parties,
e.g., if doctors account for 2/3 of all of the money spent
on lobbying, they will get 2/3 of the health budget.
In the baseline mode, initial values were selected to
put the model at a stable equilibrium prior to the intro-
duction of shocks to the system. The initial baseline
equilibrium does not include any external funding, and
there are no shifts in incidence of either disease. In the
baseline, all inflow and outflow equations are balanced
perfectly. Subsequently, the response of the model to
policy shocks can be fully attributed to the policy changes.
A stock-and-flow diagram and simulation model was cre-
ated using the VensimPLE© software [24]. Consistent with
system dynamics methodology, there are three types of
variables for each sub-system: state variables depicting
levels, difference equations depicting flow rates, and
auxiliary variables reflecting other parameters [22].
Our stock-and-flow model is comprised of the three
subsystems described below.
The model was designed solely by the investigators
during a number of team meetings by DB, LP, and QL toredraw and recalibrate the feedback loops and adjust the
parameters based on model output. Some studies in sys-
tems science are done with a specific decision-maker or
institutional client in mind. In these cases, it is quite
common to involve those decision-makers in helping to
design the model. This engages the community of practice
and research together and helps the group interpret the
output of the model to jointly improve organizational pol-
icy. However, a drawback of this bespoke approach is that
the better the model fits a specific problem, the less it fits
a general problem. The research here is intended to be of
general relevance to any setting where there is a zero sum
budget that could be allocated to prevention or cure.
Subsystem 1: the population and disease model
The subsystem for the population and its experience of
diseases A and B can be found in Figure 1. Table 1 presents
the population parameters, initial values, and relevant
assumptions. There is a stable healthy population in
which a person stops being healthy either temporarily
if an individual contracts disease A, from which each
will recover after a certain duration determined by the
activity of doctors. Population members can also exit
permanently by sudden death from disease B. If they
do not die of disease B, individuals will all die 25 years
later through a process unspecified by the model. The
population count remains stable because fertility is unim-
portant to the focus of the model. All deaths are immedi-
ately replaced by new healthy full grown individuals with
remaining lifespans of 25 years. The duration of disease A
is influenced by medical care expenditures by government
(and donors) and by fees paid to doctors in exchange for
curative services. Both the acquisition of disease A and
death from disease B lead to increments in the DALYS
lost by the population. Hence, the relative impact of one
event of either condition on the DALY measure of popula-
tion health is just a matter of the arbitrary DALY weights.
In the baseline model, we set these weights so that the
population experiences an equal burden of DALYS from
diseases A and B.
The fundamental difference between the curable dis-
ease A and the preventable disease B in the model is not
the DALY weights assigned to each as later shown in the
sensitivity analysis. The key asymmetry between A and B
is that there is no market for PCWs to charge fees for
preventing disease B. Epidemics of curable diseases will
fill the doctor’s offices with paying customers, but an
epidemic of disease B cannot generate a revenue surge
in the absence of government action. This difference in
the model corresponds to a difference in real health policy,
especially remembering that the “prevention” that is being
modeled is not clinical preventive services which can
generate revenue, but community level public health
activities (e.g., road hazard reduction) for which revenue
Figure 1 Subsystem 1: the population model. A susceptible population is at risk for either dying from disease B or transitioning temporarily
into disease A. Abbreviations: A Acumu DB, Accumulated DALYS from A; B Acumu DB, Accumulated DALYs from B; Total Accumu DB, Total
accumulated DALYs.
Bishai et al. Health Research Policy and Systems 2014, 12:28 Page 4 of 12
http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/12/1/28collection is necessarily collective. Even though real world
doctors have higher incomes than PCWs, we set their
baseline income to be equal in the model. The incomes
become unbalanced only when we allow the doctors to
charge fees to people with disease A. The assumption ofTable 1 Population subsystem parameters and assumptions
Equilibrium parameters Variable type I
Susceptible population State
Disease A infection rate Rate
Disease A patients State
Disease A incidence rate Auxiliary
Disease A duration Auxiliary
Disease A recovery rate Rate
Death from disease B Rate
Accumulated death from disease B State
Disease A annual burden Auxiliary
DALYs lost per case of disease A Auxiliary
Disease A cumulative burden State
Disease B annual burden Auxiliary
DALYs lost per case of disease B Auxiliary
Disease B cumulative burden State
Total cumulative disease burden Auxiliaryequal baseline incomes helps us see exactly what is re-
sponsible for the power imbalances that will emerge.
The power imbalance between cure and prevention is
not assumed – the imbalance comes from policies that
tie earning to curing.nitial value Notes and assumptions
800 Individuals
40 Individual infected/year
200 Infected population, at equilibrium
0.05 Population based incidence
0.2 Years
40 All infected with disease A, recover
4 Deaths/year
0 Deaths from B, at equilibrium
100 Disease A burden at equilibrium
0.5 Constant – one untreated case of infection with
A is equivalent to 0.5 years of life with disability
0 Disease A burden at equilibrium
100 Disease B burden at equilibrium
25 Constant – one death from B is equivalent to
25 years of life lost
0 Disease B burden at equilibrium
0 Sum of cumulative burden for disease A and
disease B, at equilibrium
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The subsystem depicting health resources and how they
are allocated is illustrated in Figure 2. Table 2 presents
parameters, their units, and any assumptions that are
relevant for our design. The simulated health system has
three principal funding sources: public funding for both
PCWs and doctors, private spending for curative services
only, and donor funding. Public funding is a finite source
which is allocated between doctors and PCWs through a
political bargaining process between the two categories of
health workers vying for a finite pot of governmental
health funds. Bargaining power is measured in monetary
units and each group acquires “power” by paying a portion
of their earnings into a bargaining fund. In a simple model
of “rent-seeking” the government is influenced to allocate
state resources to either group in proportion to their share
of total bargaining power. Thus, allocation of the fixed
health budget to C is proportional to C/(C + P) and alloca-
tion to P follows P/(C + P) where C is lobbying dollars
spent by curative care interests and P is lobbying dollars
spent by preventive care interests.
The model sets initial values such that the baseline
government spending is economically optimal. At base-
line, the dollars the government spends per DALY averted
is exactly the same between diseases A and B. Emotional
or political factors that might bias spending towards cure
are not burnt in as an official part of government strategy.
In addition to public funding, we set initial values so that
the arrival of external aid from donors is always unbiased
making the donor allocate new dollars to disease A or dis-
ease B to keep the incremental DALYS averted per dollar
equal and unbiased. Such a policy is crudely feasible for
donors today who could consult league tables that display
comparative $ per DALY averted from various inter-
ventions across world regions [13,25]. In the baseline
version of the model, these efficient spending levels areFigure 2 Subsystem 2: doctors (left) and PCWs (right) accumulate “po
allocated to public payments to doctors (arrow pointing left) and public paym
organizations (NGOs) named NGO-D, which donates to doctors, and NGO-P, w
number of patients with disease A also supplement doctor’s earnings.maintained in perpetuity because there are no epidemics
that might trigger donor allocations or patient care seek-
ing. Lobbying power and funding allocations between doc-
tors and PCWs will remain perfectly balanced as long as
incidence rates of either disease are unperturbed.
For policy simulation, the model imposes an exogenous
series of epidemics of A and B as a series of step functions
that raise the incidence of diseases A or B or both above
the equilibrium every 3 to 4 years. The model is able to
restore equilibrium after these step function epidemics
because the government and/or donors immediately
detect the epidemic and they rationally increase funding
towards whatever disease has risen above its baseline. The
government and donors are programmed to respond with-
out bias to disease A or B. They are set to allocate the
same $ per DALY averted to disease A as is allocated to
disease B during an epidemic, as long as there is no polit-
ical lobbying.Subsystem 3: doctor and PCW resource allocation
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the final subsystem in the
model – the lobbying process driven by doctors and
PCWs. Table 3 presents the parameters, their units, and
any assumptions that are relevant. We define political
bargaining power of doctors as proportional to resources
collected in a common lobbying fund by doctors out of
their public and private salaries. The doctors, as a group,
can then allocate the money they earn from fees, govern-
ment payments, and donor payments to either improving
recovery time for disease A in the infected population or
to lobbying activity so they can capture more public funds.
Similarly, we define PCW power as the resources amassed
by PCWs from all sources, which can then be allocated to
preventive services or lobbying. As mentioned above, PCW
resources include public funds and donor funding, but therewer” in the form of earnings. A public fund (center bottom) is
ents to PCWs (arrow pointing right). There are also two non-governmental
hich donates to PCWs. Consultation fees (bottom left) in proportion to the
Table 2 Subsystem 2 variables and assumptions
Equilibrium parameters Variable type Initial value Notes and assumptions
Public fund Auxiliary 1250 Monetary units available, at equilibrium
Political influence State N/A (Doctors spending on lobbying)/(Doctors spending on
lobbying + PCWs spending on lobbying)
Public pay to doctors Rate N/A (Political Influence*Public Fund) + NGO for doctor
Private pay for doctors Rate N/A
Consultation fees for doctors Auxiliary 3.75 Monetary units per treatment provided by doctor
Public pay to PCWs Rate N/A Public Fund × (1–Political Influence) + NGO for PCW
NGO-D State 0 Accumulated external funding to doctors
NGO-P State 0 Accumulated external funding to PCWs
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the sub-systems relate, is displayed in Figure 5.
Modeling scenarios
The model horizon is 200 months. During both model-
ing and sensitivity analyses, we tracked changes in cu-
mulative disease burden and deaths from both diseases
and cumulative spending. We used the cumulative bur-
den of disease and the cumulative spending to produce
the graphs of costs vs. DALYs averted by the various
donor spending policies.
A standard run with the simulation requires observing
its response to two types of simulated shocks: diseaseFigure 3 Subsystem 3: lobbying process – doctor power can be deple
lobbying for more resources. The proportion of power spent on lobbyin
spend on patient services the shorter the duration of disease A for patientsepidemics and external funding from donors. Without
shocks, the model stays in perpetual equilibrium. Epi-
demic times for disease A were arbitrarily selected to fall at
months 13, 49, 85, and 121; each epidemic lasted one year.
During an epidemic of disease A, the incidence rate
increased ten-fold, from 0.05 to 0.5. Epidemic times for
disease B were selected to fall at months 37, 61, 109, and
121. We tried different epidemic combinations and tim-
ings. Specifically, the system encountered an epidemic of A
alone, then an epidemic of B alone, then two epidemics of
A followed by B, and, finally, an epidemic of A and B to-
gether. We examined the system’s ability to contain these
epidemics with and without the response of NGO donors.ted by spending either on providing patient services or on
g is a constant fraction in each run of the model. The more doctors
who contract that disease.
Figure 4 Subsystem 3: lobbying process – PCW power is spent on lobbying and on shortening the incidence of death from disease B.
The proportion of power spent on lobbying is a constant fraction in each run of the model.
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their chosen disease only as long as the incidence rate is
higher than the equilibrium baseline level. Donation
policies are specified as the number of additional dollars
allocated to either disease per DALY averted. DA was
defined as the donation in terms of $ per additional
DALY of disease A after an epidemic of A and DB as the
donation in terms of $ per additional DALY of disease B
that the NGO would spend. Suppose the donation policy
is DA = $10 per epidemic DALY of A and $DB = 5 per epi-
demic DALY of B. In an epidemic with 10 additional
DALYs of A and 6 additional DALYs of B, the donations
would be $100 to A and $30 to B. In equilibrium, DA was
set to equal DB. There was no built-in role for donors to
practice disease exceptionalism [26]. To test the effects of
special pleading on behalf of either disease, we later letTable 3 Subsystem 3 variables and assumptions
Equilibrium parameters Variable type Init
Doctor power State
Doctor spending on lobbying Rate
Proportion on lobbying of doctors Auxiliary
Doctor spending on patient services Rate
PCW power State
PCW spending on lobbying Rate
Proportion on lobbying of PCWs Auxiliary
PCWs spending on prevention of disease B Ratedonation policies become discordant and we tested dona-
tion policies with DA set sequentially at {0, 5, 10, 20, 30,
40, 50, 60, 70} while, independently, DB realized values
from {20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70} [27]. A donor whose policy
was DA = 70 and DB = 10 would be indicating a bias to
spend seven times as much averting a DALY from dis-
ease A relative to disease B. A total of 81 (DA, DB) pairs
were tested and we tracked the 200 month cumulative
sum of DALYS from both of the diseases and total costs
to the government, patients, and NGOs as a result of the
NGO’s epidemic control strategies. Overall, 81 cycles were
required through the 200 month trajectory of the model
to fully assess a policy or parameter change. The graphical
output of these policy assessments involves showing a
four-dimensional manifold of costs and DALYS as co-
determined outcomes of DA and DB. We accomplishedial value Notes and assumptions
1,000 Doctor’s lobbying power at equilibrium; equals PCW
power at equilibrium
0 Doctor power × Proportion on lobbying
0.125 Doctors spent 12.5% of their resources on lobbying
0 Doctor power × (1–Proportion on lobbying of doctors)
1,000 PCW’s lobbying power at equilibrium; PCWs and doctors
start with the same level of power
0 PCW power × Proportion on lobbying of PCWs
0.5 PCWs spend 50% of their resources on lobbying
0 PCW power × (1-Proportion on lobbying of PCWs)
Figure 5 System dynamic model showing the factors affecting resource allocation. This figure displays how all of the previously introduced
sub-systems relate.
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comes generated when DA (or DB) is held constant while
DB (or DA) varies along the locus (Figures 6 and 7).
The economic problem for the NGO ought to be
choosing epidemic response policy (DA, DB) to minimize
DALYs while minimizing total cost to itself and to society.
Whether or not it espouses an economic paradigm, the
NGO does not want to achieve a situation where they
spend more and achieve more overall deaths and DALYs
due to their spending crowding out other activities in the
health system. Locating attractive and unattractive values
of (DA, DB) is our schematic version of why donors care
about data on the global burden of disease and why they
want data on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
health interventions.
Sensitivity analyses
We conducted the following sensitivity analyses in order
to ensure that the results we obtained from the main
model were robust to changes in the original parameters
and variables:
 We let years of life lost from disability per
case of disease A vary ±10% from 0.45, 0.5,
and 0.55.
 We let years of life lost from death per case of
disease B vary ±10% from 22.5, 25, and 27.5.Policy analyses
We implemented three different policy scenarios to dis-
cover how various strategies might make the system work
better.
 Eliminate lobbying for curative care and preventive
care.
 Making the public pay responsive to burden of
disease changes resulting from epidemics.
 Removing the consultation fee obtained by doctors.
Results
We found that several negative feedback loops stabilized
key levels in the model. There was negative feedback re-
storing physician incomes to baseline after their incomes
rose in an epidemic. Essentially, the epidemic gave the
doctors more money, but they ultimately spent some of
the money reducing the size of the caseload that generated
their revenue and eventually their revenue fell. The bur-
den of disease A was also restored to equilibrium through
this negative feedback loop.
The model also showed the presence of a negative feed-
back loop for government to respond to epidemics of dis-
ease B with extra spending on disease B. After disease B
returned to baseline, the rational government response to
the epidemic stopped. In the absence of the government
response to epidemics of disease B, there is no natural way
Figure 6 Baseline scenario: results of NGO donation policies at various fixed levels of NGO donation per epidemic case of disease A
from 0 to 30. Points are labeled with DA:DB, which represent, respectively, the $ per additional DALY of disease A and of disease B. At all
additional payments to the prevention workers, paying more reduces the burden of disease.
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demic of disease B and the system would simply shift to a
higher disease burden and not show return to equilibrium.
Figures 6 and 7 plot societal dollars spent vs. DALYs
averted. Note that the optimal zone in these figures
would be at the bottom left where nothing is spent and
there is no DALY burden. Points that are at the far
right represent high disease burden and little spending.
Starting from the bottom, as more is spent there is aFigure 7 Baseline scenario: evidence of population harm from expand
sloping up and to the right indicate options that cost progressively more a
beyond a threshold of $20 per DALY of disease A. Points are labeled with D
disease A and of disease B. DB is held constant within each iso-policy curverise in the vertical dimension and the DALY burden
can become lower, moving to the left. As shown in
Figures 6 and 7, there were diminishing returns to scale
from NGOs investing in either disease – progressive
amounts of money spent in the vertical dimension led to
smaller and smaller reductions in DALY burden. Figure 6
shows that, with spending on doctors held fixed, more
spent on PCWs had a continuously increasing incremen-
tal cost per DALY averted.ing payments to doctors. The parts of the cost effectiveness curves
nd increase the burden of disease. These undesirable options occur
A:DB, which represent, respectively, the $ per additional DALY of
.
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generated negative returns with overall declines in popula-
tion health per incremental $ spent on doctors’ services
per epidemic DALY of disease A after spending surpassed
a threshold. The harm is exclusively due to a higher DALY
burden of unprevented cases of disease B. These cases
of B were not prevented because the windfall payments to
doctors during an epidemic of disease A were used to
lobby the government for a larger share of the fixed
health budget. An epidemic of disease A would trigger
more fee based revenue for doctors, more NGO based
revenue for doctors, and more government based
revenue as a rational response. Whereas the NGOs and
government were obligated to allocate funds rationally
in proportion to the DALY burden, the sick patients,
during epidemics of disease A, were not pursuing an
optimal societal allocation of revenue to doctors. The
patient revenue to doctors helped their lobbying power
grow abnormally large. Patient-driven revenue led to so
much doctor lobbying power that the prevention budget
became squeezed towards zero and the burden of disease
B rose. In models where DA was a lot higher than DB, the
iatrogenic epidemic of disease B could trigger remedial
spending by the donor, but government health budgets
had limited response to the epidemic due to doctor
lobbying. Spending on doctors during the epidemic of
disease A leads to doctors’ lobbying activity depleting
the fixed government allocations to PCWs and leaving
the population vulnerable to disease B. Without the
agency of PCWs to prevent disease B, people perished
in higher numbers. In Figure 7, the model shows nega-
tive returns to investment in responding to cures with
an inflection point occurring around $20 per DALY of
disease A. Being willing to spend more than $20 per
case of disease A in an epidemic of disease A creates a
higher death rate from unprevented cases of disease B.
Our sensitivity analysis, which focused on testing dif-
ferent DALY weights for diseases A and B as well as
disruptions in funding to either doctors or PCWs, con-
firmed the robustness of the phenomenon of negative
returns to spending high amounts per case of B. We
observed the same findings despite 10% shifts in the
DALY weight for either disease and despite 10% shifts
in the government’s standard response to epidemics,
signaling that our conclusions were not simply a prod-
uct of our initial set of parameters.
Policy analysis explored what happens in a context
where doctors lose their ability to earn consultation fees
from seeing patients. By removing doctors’ disease-
driven earning, and therefore making their income sym-
metrical to PCWs, we saw the backward bending cost-
DALYs effects observed in Figure 7 disappear. Another
policy analysis removed all lobbying power of both doc-
tors and PCWs. By removing lobbying from our model,we no longer observed the backward bending effects seen
in Figure 7. Either modification was enough to eliminate
the damaging effects on population health of spending
more money on curative services. Both solutions were
effective and the results qualitatively resemble Figure 7
(results available in a supplementary appendix).
Discussion
This system dynamics model of resource allocation ex-
plicitly models political influences on the allocation of
public spending in the health sector. It illustrates poten-
tial unintended consequences from fully rational NGO
contributions to respond to epidemics. Considerations
from complex adaptive systems guided the exploration
of non-linear, unintended consequences in a simulated
health system – something that cannot be accomplished
using traditional cost-effectiveness analysis techniques.
The results offer several cautions about irrational distor-
tions that occur in human systems even when rational
policies are pursued. The donors in the simulation were
efficiently allocating resources in proportion to the oppor-
tunity to avert the most DALYs per dollar, but political
lobbying resulted in their allocations to the doctors snow-
balling into a large political lobbying fund that starved the
preventive work of the PCWs and led to higher costs and
unnecessary deaths.
It is significant to note that the NGO’s response to epi-
demics of disease A did not factor in the fungibility of pri-
vate spending on disease A. The NGO was programmed
to assume that its donations were not being matched by
private sector patient payments. If the NGO had been re-
ducing its donations dollar for dollar in response to pri-
vate spending, then the tragic loss of life from the crowd
out of preventive spending would not have occurred.
Traditional cost-effectiveness models have no way to
simulate this type of unintended consequence because
traditional cost-effectiveness measures costs, but says little
about who will ultimately pay the cost. Furthermore, trad-
itional cost-effectiveness cannot accommodate a positive
feedback loop in which spending on a particular health re-
source creates obligations to irrationally escalate spending
on that resource due to political pressure from those who
prosper from the initial allocation.
Our findings add further insights into the debate on
optimal resource allocation between curative and pre-
ventive care. Because curative medicine offers services
whose benefits are privately enjoyed by each sick person
they are defined by economics as “excludable goods”.
Market mechanisms work well to balance supply of re-
source flows in proportion to the demand for excludable
goods [28]. In contrast, the benefits of community
prevention-work are non-excludable; everyone benefits
but wants someone else to pay. With no defined prop-
erty rights to transmit an effective demand signal to
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adaptation. The under-investment in community pre-
vention joins a long list of many other market failures in
health [28]. Community health advocacy falls to an as-
sorted collection of community advocates, academics,
and enlightened spokespersons [29]. In public policy-
making it is common to hear advocates declare that
their sector is “high priority” and requires special treat-
ment [30]; it can be difficult at times to assess the legitim-
acy of competing claims. However, the missing market for
population-level prevention efforts and their history of
extremely large benefits at low cost suggests that this
might be an area that is perennially and inappropri-
ately neglected.
Our model’s focus on the asymmetric ability of the
doctor class to achieve political clout from billable fees
offers a cautionary lesson for NGO donors. When donors
compassionately invest in curative strategies they may un-
wittingly contribute to the rent-seeking capability of the
doctors. Health systems can inappropriately de-prioritize
prevention efforts delivered at population level. If it were
easy to do so, an NGO or donor should stay informed
about private revenue streams that could be augmenting
their own allocation to address health problems. These
private revenue flows can unbalance what could have been
a measured response to a health issue, and require the
donor to offset its contribution accordingly or focus to
sub-populations that were not being covered privately.
Funding for HIV/AIDS treatment programs in low-
income countries may be an example where cure is
crowding out prevention through a mechanism similar
to the one in the model. Countries with limited human
resources for health cannot absorb large amounts of
donor spending on antiretroviral programs without staff
redeploying away from their primary care jobs into the
well-funded antiretroviral programs. Evidence of weaker
performance on maternal and child health programs
where HIV burdens are higher might be suggesting this
sort of tradeoff [31,32].
Although we use the word “lobbying”, the basic dy-
namics observed in the model do not require there to
be an organized medical, pharmaceutical, or hospital
association with a specific lobbying fund supporting
politicians; real-world health care interest lobbies are
much more subtle. Health care lobbying can be emotion-
ally appealing and seductive. It is common for motivated
disease advocates to spotlight a photo with a victim of
a curable disease, or to note how a disease victim’s
treatment is a human right [33,34]. Global donors are
emphasizing disease-curing funds (e.g., providing AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria treatments). The drive towards
universal health insurance coverage is also an instance of
lobbying that serves clinical interests while addressing
rights to health care services. The growth of healthinsurance can trigger a self-perpetuating feedback loop
of political power by those who provide clinical care.
One approach to protect prevention would be to ring
fence prevention funds. Another approach would allo-
cate donor funds preferentially to the neglected preven-
tion sector as was done during a World Bank loan to
Argentina [35]. Both of these approaches face challenges
if the government is under high lobbying pressure. The
ring fence can be punctured and the aid can be fungibly
reallocated unless there is high commitment by the
government to preserve a high priority sector [30].
Our model shows that the harmful spiral can be elimi-
nated by eliminating patient fee payments or by eliminat-
ing any lobby-type linkage between health worker revenue
and government spending. Although these extreme sce-
narios were modeled, total elimination is impractical in
the real world. The reason to focus on patient fees is that
it is only the fees that give doctors asymmetric growth in
epidemic-driven revenue that is not enjoyed by PCWs.
Epidemics of disease A enriched the doctors in payments
from both doctors and the government. Epidemics of
disease B enriched the PCWs only from government or
donor funds because there could be no private market
based on preventing disease B. The absence of a function-
ing market for community prevention efforts requires a
central planning function to step into the breach and dial
up or down government spending based on epidemio-
logical data and data on total health expenditure. Our
paper emphasizes that this central intervention is prone to
being captured and manipulated by selfish interest groups
and requires institutional measures that insulate it. The
National Health Service of the UK offers an example of a
policy solution to this dilemma in which public health
budgets are “ring-fenced” to prevent clinical enterprises
from infringing on them [36].
Our model provides a quantitative application of complex
adaptive system methodologies to health care systems and
policy analysis [37-40]. It is an illustrative tool which was
created to foster insight and understanding of unintended
consequences from the financing of curative and preven-
tion care. Preventive community-wide efforts in health
labor under several disadvantages. When preventive ser-
vices need to compete against cure for a common pool of
government resources they are likely to suffer. They can
be politically outgunned because curative health workers
have the ability to amass more money through fees while
community prevention workers cannot. A zero-sum game
played between prevention and cure is not a fair contest.
Abbreviations
DALYs: Disability-adjusted life years; NGO: Non-governmental organization;
PCWs: Preventive care workers.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Bishai et al. Health Research Policy and Systems 2014, 12:28 Page 12 of 12
http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/12/1/28Authors’ contributions
DB led the conceptualization and implementation of this activity. DB, LP, and QL
developed the final model and analyzes, as well as prepared the first draft of the
manuscript. DHP and AAH contributed to revisions and finalizing the manuscript.
All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
Generous support provided by Bloomberg Philanthropies Global Road Safety
Program and the Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research. Support
also provided by Future Health Systems a research policy consortium of
DFID. This paper is part of the Thematic Series entitled: “Advancing the
application of systems thinking in health”. The Series was coordinated by the
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems research, World Health Organization.
The publication of the Series and the associated capacity building and
dissemination activities were carried out with the aid of a grant from the
International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada.
Author details
1Department of Population Family and Reproductive Health, Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health, 615 N. Wolfe St., Room E4622, Baltimore,
MD 21205, USA. 2Department of International Health, Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health, 615 N. Wolfe St., Baltimore, MD 21205,
USA. 3International Injury Research Unit, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health, 615 N. Wolfe St., Baltimore, MD 21205, USA.
Received: 13 December 2013 Accepted: 28 April 2014
Published: 16 June 2014
References
1. Getzen T: Health Economics and Financing. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley; 2007.
2. Neumann PJ: Why don't Americans use cost-effectiveness analysis? Am J
Manag Care 2004, 10(5):308–312.
3. Centers for Disease Cotrol: Estimated national spending on prevention–United
States, 1988. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1992, 41:529–531.
4. Miller G, Roehrig C, Hughes-Cromwick P, Lake C: Quantifying national
spending on wellness and prevention. Adv Health Econ Health Serv Res
2008, 19:1–24.
5. Grogan CM: Prevention spending. J Health Polit Policy Law 2012,
37(2):329–342.
6. Walker N, Yenokyan G, Friberg IK, Bryce J: Patterns in coverage of
maternal, newborn, and child health interventions: projections of
neonatal and under-5 mortality to 2035. Lancet 2013,
382(9897):1029–1038.
7. Srivastava D: A review of the evidence. In Health and Living Conditions
Network of the European Observatory on the Social Situation and
Demography. Londo: London School of Economics and Political Science;
2008.
8. Flessa S: Where efficiency saves lives: a linear programme for the optimal
allocation of health care resources in developing countries. Health Care
Manag Sci 2000, 3(3):249–267.
9. Anand S: The concern for equity in health. J Epidemiol Community Health
2002, 56(7):485–487.
10. Bishai D, Kumar S, Waters HR, Koenig M, Katz J, West K: What is the Impact
of a Vitamin A Intervention on Health Equity? Evidence from Nepal. Population
Association of America: Minneapolis; 2003.
11. Bishai D, Koenig M, Ali Khan M: Measles vaccination improves the equity
of health outcomes: evidence from Bangladesh. Health Econ 2003,
12(5):415–419.
12. Neumann PJ, Cohen JT: Cost savings and cost-effectiveness of clinical preventive
care. The Synthesis Project: New Insights from Research Results. Policy Brief No. 18.
Princeton, NJ: Roberto Wood Johnson Foundation; 2009.
13. Jamison DT, Evans DB, Alleyne G, Jha P, Breman J, Measham AR, Claeson M,
Mills A, Musgrove PR: Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries (2nd
Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006.
14. Walt G: Health Policy: An Introduction to Process and Power. New York, NY:
Zed Books; 1994.
15. Hipgrave D, Alderman K, Anderson I, Soto E: Health sector priority setting
at meso-level in lower and middle income countries: lessons learned,
available options and suggested steps. Soc Sci Med 2014, 102:190–200.
16. Hunsmann M: Limits to evidence-based health policymaking: Policy hurdles
to structural HIV prevention in Tanzania. Soc Sci Med 2012, 74(10):1477–1485.17. Briscombe B, Sharma S, Saunders M: Improving Resource Allocation in Kenya's
Public Sector. Health Policy Initiative – prepared for USAID: Washington,
DC; 2010.
18. Paina L, Peters DH: Understanding pathways for scaling up health
services through the lens of complex adaptive systems. Health Policy Plan
2012, 27(5):365–373.
19. Adam T, de Savigny D: Systems thinking for strengthening health
systems in LMICs: need for a paradigm shift. Health Policy Plan 2012,
27(Suppl 4):iv1–iv3.
20. Plsek PE, Greenhalgh T: The challenge of complexity in health care. BMJ
2001, 323(7313):625–628.
21. Swanson RC, Cattaneo A, Bradley E, Chunharas S, Atun R, Abbas KM,
Katsaliaki K, Mustafee N, Mason Meier B, Best A: Rethinking health systems
strengthening: key systems thinking tools and strategies for
transformational change. Health Policy Plan 2012, 27(Suppl 4):iv54–iv61.
22. Forrester JW: Industrial Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1961.
23. Epstein J: Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-Based Computational
Modeling. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2007.
24. Vensim: [http://vensim.com/]
25. WHO-CHOICE: [http://www.who.int/choice/en/]
26. Smith JH, Whiteside A: The history of AIDS exceptionalism. J Int AIDS Soc
2010, 13:47.
27. Improvement of nutritive quality of foods. JAMA 1968, 205(12):868–869.
28. Rice T: The Economics of Health Reconsidered. Chicago: Health Administration
Press; 1998.
29. Loue S: Community health advocacy. J Epidemiol Community Health 2006,
60(6):458–463.
30. Bevan D: Promoting and protecting high-priority expenditures. CGD Working
Paper. Center for Global Development: Washington, DC; 2007.
31. Grepin KA: HIV donor funding has both boosted and curbed the delivery
of different non-HIV health services in sub-Saharan Africa. Health Aff
(Millwood) 2012, 31(7):1406–1414.
32. Case A, Paxson C: The impact of the AIDS pandemic on health services in
Africa: evidence from demographic and health surveys. Demography
2011, 48(2):675–697.
33. Boama V, Arulkumaran S: Safer childbirth: a rights-based approach. Int J
Gynaecol Obstet 2009, 106(2):125–127.
34. Holmes JL: A human rights-based approach to HIV health care. HIV Clin
2012, 24(3):5–7.
35. Second Essential Public Health Functions Project (FESP II). World Bank:
Washington, DC; 2010.
36. Department of Health UK: Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS. London:
National Health Service; 2010.
37. Barber P, Lopez-Valcarcel BG: Forecasting the need for medical specialists
in Spain: application of a system dynamics model. Hum Resour Health
2010, 8:24.
38. Loyo HK, Batcher C, Wile K, Huang P, Orenstein D, Milstein B: From model
to action: using a system dynamics model of chronic disease risks to
align community action. Health Promot Pract 2013, 14(1):53–61.
39. Merrill JA, Deegan M, Wilson RV, Kaushal R, Fredericks K: A system
dynamics evaluation model: implementation of health information
exchange for public health reporting. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2013,
20(e1):e131–e138.
40. Wu MH, Yu JY, Huang CH: Theoretical system dynamics modeling for
Taiwan Pediatric Workforce in an era of national health insurance and
low birth rates. Pediatr Neonatol 2013, 54(6):389–396.
doi:10.1186/1478-4505-12-28
Cite this article as: Bishai et al.: Advancing the application of systems
thinking in health: why cure crowds out prevention. Health Research
Policy and Systems 2014 12:28.
